This paper focuses on the spatial concentration of two essential factors of production in the commercial field of biotechnology: ideas and money. The location of both research-intensive biotech firms and the venture capital firms that fund biotech is highly clustered in a handful of key U.S. regions. The commercialization of a new medicine and the financing of a high-risk startup firm are both activities that have an identifiable timeline, and often involve collaboration with multiple participants. The importance of tacit knowledge, face-to-face contact, and the ability to learn and manage across multiple projects are critical reasons for the continuing importance of geographic propinquity in biotech. Over the period 1988-99, more than half of the U.S. biotech firms received locally-based venture funding. Those firms receiving non-local support were older, larger, and had moved research projects further along the commercialization process. Similarly, as VC firms grow older and bigger, they invest in more non-local firms. But these patterns have a strong regional basis, with notable differences between Boston, New York, and West Coast money. Biotechnology is unusual in its dual dependence on basic science and venture financing; other fields in which product development is not as dependent on the underlying science may have different spatial patterns.
Introduction
Our focus is on the relationships between dedicated biotechnology companies and the venture capital firms that finance them. These are, in a sense, unusual relationships in that they are designed with a termination point in mind, at which time the venture capitalist exits and moves on. Nor are they exclusive relationships. A venture capitalist is likely to invest in many different biotech firms, including some who are likely to be competitors in a particular therapeutic area, such as cardiology, or with a particular technology, such as genomics. Biotech firms may well have backing from multiple venture capitalists, either as part of a collective, such as a group or syndicate, or separately as a means to finance discrete projects, such as a specialized use of a more general purpose technology. Biotech firms also garner financial support from multiple sources, through government research grants, R&D alliances with major corporations, and selling minority equity stakes. For a biotech firm to become financially successful, it needs to develop a promising pipeline with numerous new medicines. Each potential product is, in some respects, a separate project that involves different internal staff and disparate external collaborators. At a venture firm, a portfolio of investments is developed with divergent levels of risk, different timelines, and varied expected payoffs.
For both biotechs and venture firms, learning across partners and projects, and developing experience working with diverse parties, is critical to success (POWELL, KOPUT, and SMITH-DOERR, 1996) .
We analyze the spatial aspects of these relationships, examining how the role of location shifts over time as projects, firms and regions mature. Our data are drawn from the commercial field of human biotechnology, specifically the wave of founding of new biotech firms in the U.S. over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . This field is remarkably clustered spatially, with over 48% of all U.S. firms located in either Northern California, the Boston Metropolitan area, or San Diego County. We map the industry's growth, showing a pattern of cluster-based proliferation. We match our biotech data to a data set on firms that provide venture capital to our sample of biotech companies. Venture capital is also spatially concentrated, in the Bay Area, Boston, and New York. We use descriptive statistics to analyze whether the linkages between biotech and venture capital are exclusively local, have a local component, or are non-local.
The Co-location of Science and Capital
We take as our starting point the spatial concentration of two key factors of production in the commercial field of biotechnology: ideas and money. Casual observers might wonder why these two endowments, which are highly fungible, easily transportable, in short, weightless (LEADBEATER, 2000) , are so strongly concentrated regionally. Abundant evidence points to the clustering of both knowledge and capital.
Ideas, especially knowledge from the frontiers of cutting-edge science, have a strong tacit dimension (NELSON and WINTER, 1982) . When knowledge is more tacit in character, face-to-face communication and interaction are important (VON HIPPLE, 1994) . Consequently, to understand the science, one has to participate in its development. Hence new scientific advances have a form of natural excludability (ZUCKER, DARBY, and BREWER, 1998) . In the early years of the biotechnology industry, firms were founded in close proximity to research institutes and universities where the advances in basic science were being made (KENNEY, 1986; AUDRETSCH and STEPHAN, 1996; PREVEZER, 1996; ZUCKER et al, 1998) . There are two key elements to this clustering process. One aspect is captured by research on knowledge spillovers, where geographic proximity facilitates the spread of innovative ideas (JAFFE, TRAJTENBERG, and HENDERSON, 1993; AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN, 1996) .
But while intellectual capital is necessary, it may not be not sufficient. A supportive institutional infrastructure that fosters knowledge transfer and the formation of technology-based companies is also critical (POWELL, 1996) .
Consider the case of Atlanta, Georgia, where there is a major research center, the Center for Disease Control, a technology-based university, Georgia Tech, and one of the top medical schools in the country at Emory University. The metropolitan area is reasonably well-to-do and well-educated, and a number of Fortune 500 firms are headquartered there. But there is little in the way of commercial biotechnology, despite abundant intellectual resources. One biomedical entrepreneur at Georgia Tech told us that he has had numerous overtures from financiers and angel investors for his technologies, but they have all made leaving Atlanta and moving to California a requirement of obtaining the financing.
Or consider the often-cited list of founders of some of the key firms created in the late 1970s and 1980s: Genentech (Herbert Boyer, University of California -San Francisco), Biogen (Walter Gilbert, Harvard), Hybritech (Ivar Royston, University of California -San Diego), Genetics Institute (Mark Ptashne, Harvard), Systemix (David Baltimore, MIT and Whitehead Institute), and Immulogic (Malcolm Gefter, MIT).
1 All of these eminent scientists retained their university affiliations, often full-time. They were able, so to speak, to have their cake and eat it too, precisely because their universities had created rules and routines that enabled technology transfer and faculty entrepreneurship. There are many regions where there is scientific excellence but not the requisite infrastructure to capture the rents from knowledge spillovers.
Our emphasis on this infrastructure of university techno logy transfer, venture capital, law firms, consultants, and the like is somewhat different from treatments of industrial districts, in the tradition of MARSHALL (1920) . Economists and geographers have long recognized the tendency for production to cohere geographically, whether it is cars in Detroit, steel in the Ruhr, silk in Lyon, or filmmaking in Hollywood. Spatial concentration confers advantages in terms of transportation costs, access to skilled labor markets, communication networks, sophisticated customers, and access to technology (SCOTT and STORPER, 1987; FLORIDA and KENNEY, 1988; ANGEL, 1991; SAXENIAN, 1994; STORPER and SALAIS, 1997) . Once these agglomeration economies are established, a dynamic process of increasing returns attracts new entrant s, further fueling the pace of innovation (ARTHUR, 1991; KRUGMAN, 1991) .
Consequently, the geographic clustering of production is a global phenomenon.
(PORTER, 1998, provides numerous examples.)
Our emphasis is less on the process of economizing on the transaction costs of founding a new firm, or the many attractions that draw entrepreneurs to a region. We are interested in understanding why firms --based on a fast-moving science that is continually creating new opportunities --are formed in particular locales. AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN (1996:634) put the question aptly: "even after accounting for the geographic concentration of the production location, why does the propensity for innovative activity to cluster vary across industries?" The relevant scientific expertise in biotech is, by now, broadly distributed throughout the industrial world, with major centers of scientific excellence in the U.S., the U.K., Sweden, France, Germany, and
Switzerland. But the science is commercialized by firms in a significant manner (by which we mean the ability to bring novel medicines to a global marketplace) in only a handful of locations worldwide. To understand this phenomenon, we have to explain why some regions are hubs for organizational creation, that is, populated, by organizations, that are in the business of creating other organizations (STINCHCOMBE, 1965) . Put differently, some regions are incubators and constitute an ecology for organizational formation (BROWN, 2000) . These regions have a rich mix of diverse kinds of organizations (e.g., universities, law firms specializing in intellectual property, public research institutes, consultants, and venture capitalists) that contribute in varying ways to founding technology-based companies. The advantages of location, then, are very much based on access and information. Increasing returns are present in the form of overlapping networks, recombinant projects, personal and professional relationships, and interpersonal trust and reputation, all of which are thickened over time. In such a milieu, access to reliable information about new opportunities occurs through personal and professional networks, and these ties are critical in reducing uncertainty about projects that are not well understood by non-experts, exceedingly risky in terms of their payoff, and unclear in terms of their eventual market impact.
Venture capital (VC), defined as "independent, professionally managed, dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity or equity-linked investments in privately he ld, high growth companies" (GOMPERS and LERNER, 2001: 146) , is one of the key elements of the infrastructure of innovation. The private equity market has become a major source of financing for start-up firms, and has grown at an explosive rate: in 1979 venture firms dispersed $500 million in funds, that amount climbed to well over $67 billion by 2000 (WRIGHT and ROBBIE, 1998; GOMPERS and LERNER, 2001 SAHLMAN, 1990 , to be at 99%). As in many other walks of life, many call but few are answered. More opportunities are identified through active search by VCs. In part, this is because the expected payoff demanded from VC backing is very high and the ratio of success to failures about 2 in 10 (BYGRAVE and TIMMONS, 1992; GOMPERS and LERNER, 1999) .
In the life sciences and other technology-based fields, venture firms provide more than money. Because many of the founders of biotech firms are research scientists, venture capitalists often do much more than monitor or advise; they may even play a hands-on role in the running of the young company. Keeping scientists focused on key commercial milestones is no small feat. A powerful tool for focusing their attention is the "staging" of VC financing, thus the commitment of capital is contingent upon "progress" (GOMPERS, 1995) . VCs also routinely help in recruiting key staff and important collaborators, and provide referrals to law and accounting firms, and eventually to investment banks (FLORIDA and KENNEY, 1988) . Many VCs serve on the boards of directors of young firms they fund. As GILSON and BLACK (1998) With all these advantages of geographic propinquity, it might seem unlikely that more distant relations occur at all. There are, to be sure, several ways that VCs overcome some of the liabilities of distance. Both the creation of branch offices and involvement in VC syndicates are means to counter the challenges of more distant relations (SORENSEN and STUART, 2001) . Increased size and greater experience could also provide VC firms with the capability to support more distant firms. VC firms may follow different approaches when they are investing their own money versus that of limited partners, or when they join another VC's fund as a member of a syndicate. In addition, the pace of advancement of new industries and the mix of firms within them may offer new opportunities for investment. For example, VCs may perform a different role with an early-stage company than in a firm that has already undergone its first round of financing and shown evidence that its technology can be brought to market. We turn now to a discussion of the factors that shape the proclivity of biotech-VC relations to occur on a local or more distant basis.
Explaining Center and Periphery
The literature on knowledge spillovers provides useful leads on both how and when geographic localization matters. 2 One insight is that the importance of propinquity can decline over time. JAFFE et al (1993) report that patent citations to other patents (excluding within-organization citations) are five to ten times more likely to occur within the same city. This pattern of localization is most pronounced in the first year following a patent's issue, and subsequently declines. In a parallel vein, they also found that patents in such fast-developing fields as optics and nuclear technology have high initial citation rates that fade rapidly. ALMEIDA and KOGUT (1997) report similar results for patenting activity in the semiconductor industry, with high rates of local citations that subside over time.
The joint effects of technological evolution and the stages in a firm's life cycle are not easily disentangled, however. Two excellent studies of biotechnology point out this difficulty. ZUCKER et al (1998) show that the founding of new biotechnology firms in the 1970s and 1980s occurred in those regions rich in the relevant intellectual capital, and that "star" scientists had a direct role in this process as founders and advisors. To pursue the latter issue, regarding distinctive stages in organizational, industry, and technological life cycles, we explore whether biotech firms and venture capital funders are more likely to be co-located when the biotechs are younger and/or smaller. If biotech firms are able to wait until they are older and/or larger before securing venture support, they may well be able to choose from a broader set of financial backers. We also explore the other side of this coin, recognizing that just as biotech firms search for private equity, venture capitalists look for new technologies to bankroll. Thus, we ask, under what circumstances do venture firms look outside their local environments?
There is an unexplored finding in the Audretsch and Stephan study that intrigues us, suggesting that the relevant actors in different locales have different "propensities" to either search locally or at a distance. University scientists in Boston, the Bay Area, and San Diego that served on biotech advisory boards were very likely to do so locally, while scientists in New York, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Houston served on the boards of more distant companies. Such variation in search behavior may reflect differences in access to contacts or different resource endowments. These are issues at the heart of research on interorganizational exchange. One strand of analysis emphasizes that interorganizational ties are strongly influenced by social structure, with previous exchanges shaping subsequent ties (GRANOVETTER, 1985; GULATI, 1995) .
Organizations privileged by prior access obtain better rates of financing (UZZI, 1999) and overcome liabilities of newness more easily (BAUM and OLIVER, 1991) . When organizations share a common prior partner, they find it easier to engage in exchange (GULATI and GARGIULO, 1999) . And, when there is uncertainty about the merits of an activity, as is often the case with new and unproven technologies, previous affiliations can serve as a proxy for quality (PODOLNY, 1994) . Not surprisingly, startup companies go to considerable lengths to advertise the backing of elite venture firms to attract emplo yees and collaborators. In short, social relationships are essential to the process of garnering resources to found new organizations.
But can affiliations compensate for less expertise or capability? Alternatively, can organizations that are pursuing excellent science, but located away from key centers of activity and lacking access to well-connected parties, find much-needed support?
Clearly, centrality in networks and expertise are self-reinforcing (STUART, 1998 percent of the companies in our sample were located in the U.S. and ten percent in Europe. For the purposes of this paper, we limit the sample to U.S.-based companies because of the ease of using U.S. zip codes as a means to determine geographic location.
During the period 1988-99, 213 U.S. biotech firms received funds from venture capital companies.
The reference source BioScan reports information on a firm's ownership, formal contractual linkages to collaborators, products and current research. In addition, detailed information is provided on a company's financial history, and we drew from this source data on venture capital investments in specific biotech companies. We also utilize data on the founding date and employment levels of biotech companies. Our database draws on BioScan's April issue, in which new information is added for each calendar year.
For information on venture capital forms, we consulted Pratt's Guide to Venture
Capital Sources, a reference guide to U.S. and non-U.S. VC firms. The guide was first published in 1970, followed by new editions in 1972, 1974, and 1977 . Since the fifth edition, it has been updated annually, based on information provided by the VC firms. In addition to information on the location of home and branch offices, key staff, and founding dates, the guide covers VC firms' preferences in terms of their preferred role in financing, the type of financing they provide, and whether they have geographic or industry preferences. The guide also reports the amount of capital the VC firm manages, and whether the firm primarily invests money raised from limited partners or its own Each biotech firm is then placed into one of three mutually exclusive categories based on whether it is only involved in dyads with local VCs, only involved in dyads with nonlocal VCs, or involved in dyads with both local and nonlocal VCs. We do this separately for when the biotech firm is at two distinct stages of development, before and after its initial public offering (IPO). For each biotech firm, we also measure a number of firm attributes, including its age, experience in the industry's inter-organizational network (connecting biotech with universities, government agencies, financiers, nonprofit labs, and large pharmaceutical and chemical corporations), number of employees, time from founding to IPO, time from its first network tie to IPO, number of VC partners, number of other partners (besides VC), and centrality in four inter-organizatio nal networks: R&D, finance, licensing, and commercialization.
Each VC firm is also placed into one of the three exclusive categories based on whether it only funds local biotech firms, only funds nonlocal biotech firms, or funds both local and nonlocal biotech firms. We do this assignment separately for funded biotech firms that are pre and post-IPO. For each VC, we also have measures of age, number of offices, capitalization, and whether it is primarily investing its founders' own money or other inve stors' money.
Results
We begin with a graphic presentation of the location of our samples of biotech and VC firms. We now examine features of biotech firms that receive funding from VCs, treating firms that are pre-and post-IPO separately. Table 1 and larger in terms of offices (1.9 vs. 1.7), but have less capital (229M vs 336M), and are more likely to spend their own money (84% vs 65%) when compared to VCs that fund nonlocal biotechs. When the support comes after the biotech firm's IPO, the story is more complicated. Those firms that provide backing exclusively locally or exclusively nonlocally are about the same size (1.5 offices), age (roughly 12 years), and capitalization, but those going local only are more likely to be spending their own money (81% vs 60%). Those VCs that support publicly held firms both locally and nonlocally are much older (17.3 years), larger (2 offices), more capitalized (388M) and are even more likely to be spending their own money (87%). Thus, older, more experienced venture capital firms, that have the benefits of being located in technology-rich locations, are able to be more flexible as to where they invest. In addition, a strong persistent finding is that when the VCs invest their own money, their disbursements are very likely to be made locally.
(Table 3 goes here.)
We also checked to see what the relationship was between the age of VCs and the age of biotechs at the time of their IPOs. One speculation is that younger VCs bring companies public earlier than older firms in order to build a reputation and raise needed funds (GOMPERS, 1996) . In our sample, in contrast, there was a negative relation between VC age and the age of the biotech firm at IPO. This relationship was driven by experienced, older VCs in the Bay Area and San Diego that funded local younger firms and East Coast VCs that manage funds with both local and non-local younger biotechs.
In sum, the gains from experience for older VCs include both the capacity to oversee younger firms as well as more geographically distant firms. For the venture capital firms, then, there is a recursive relationship: as the biotech industry matures, the significance of geographic proximity declines somewhat as extra-local ties are developed. On the other hand, as VC firms mature and become more experienced, their willingness and ability to work with high-risk local startups increases.
One of the particularities of venture capital is that it arose and grew in different places at different times. Consequently, there may be distinct patterns of financing based on location. To examine this, we collapse the regions into three areas--the Bay Area, Boston, and the rest of the country. Between the Bay Area and Boston, over half of the "action" occurs, so this tripartite division is sensible. Looking first across the twelve year period, there are some discernable patterns. With respect to companies that only receive local support, venture firms in the Bay Area tend to fund smaller, younger companies, that have collaborations underway to commercialize new products. In Boston, local only funding goes to larger and older biotechs, who are more involved in R&D collaborations and licensing agreements. Outside these two main centers, local VC funding goes more to medium-sized companies. With regards to funding that originates outside the "home" region, the biotech recipients within Boston cluster are the younger and smaller biotechs, while in the Bay Area cluster these firms tend to be older. In the rest of the country, outside support flows to older and larger companies. Finally, the firms that receive financing both locally and from the outside are older in both Boston and the Bay Area.
But, firms receiving both types of financing that are located elsewhere in the U.S. are among the youngest, smallest, and best connected into the world of R&D. Clearly, the threshold for receiving both types of financing is higher for companies located outside the Bay Area or Boston.
( Table 4 goes R&D is three times as likely to generate patents as corporate-sponsored R&D (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . In large part, this effect is due to the direct stake entrepreneurs have in start-up firms and the fact that entrepreneurs in large organizations receive only a small share of the rewards from corporate innovation. But venture capital support also has a catalytic effect. Many companies report that VC funding is a key milestone, and symbolically more important than other kinds of financing (Hellman and Puri, 2000) .
Our results show that VC backing is a strong signal, attracting other VCs from outside the local area and sustaining a process where subsequent rounds of support are garnered at the post-IPO stage.
We find a strong pattern of spatial concentration in biotech and venture capital.
Given that VCs and biotech are both found in considerable number in the Bay Area and Boston, it is not surprising that much VC support is locally-based. A little more than half the biotech firms in our sample received local VC disbursements, and that percentage rose to 58% within our key geographic clusters. 
